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RECENT CASES
modifying. She contended that Superior Court jurisdiction to modify cannot be invoked
by a motion and affidavit. Held: Writ granted. RCW 26.08.170 [REm. Supp. 1949 §
997-17] (formerly RRS § 995-3; PPC § 7511-3) provides that "upon filing of a prop-
erly verified petition ... the Superior Court... shall have full and complete jurisdic-
tion of the -cause." State ex rel. Edwards v. Superior Court, 37 Wn. 2d 8, 221 P. 2d
518 (1950). The decision apparently implies that filing a petition is the only effective
procedure.
This is a surprising result. The usual modem view is that there is no substantial
difference between a petition and a written motion. In the language of Gibbs v. Ewing,
94 Fla. 236, 113 So. 730 (1927), "There are no precise boundaries between motions and
petitions. The latter merely amount to motions in writing." In Washington it was
early recognized that the substance and not the form of a pleading determines its
character and effect. In Baer v. LeBeck, 126 Wash. 576, 219 Pac. 22 (1923), the court
said, "It is true that the portion of the application was at the heading termed a motion
but it contains allegations which make it in substance a petition." In re Force, 113
Wash. 151, 193 Pac. 698 (1920) is to the same effect. The court in the Force case
found "no merit" in a contention that a motion was improper procedure when a statute
called for a petition, and later remarked in Harju v. Anderson, 125 Wash. 161, 215
Pac. 327 (1923), that the pleading in the Force case was titled a motion but "in sub-
stance and fact was a petition." More recently the court held that a pleading, though
titled a motion, would be treated as a petition to insure a hearing on the merits. Valley
Iron Works Inc. v. Independent Bakery Inc., 171 Wash. 349, 17 P. 2d 898 (1933). One
court has reached a result exactly contrary to that of the instant case. In Bishop v.
Bishop, 238 Ky. 702, 38 S.W. 2d 657 (1931), it was held that a motion to modify the
custody provisions of a divorce decree satisfies a statute requiring that a petition be
filed.
The instant case is also difficult to reconcile with McClelland v. McClelland, 163
Wash. 59, 299 Pac. 984 (1931), in which the Court observed in another context that the
procedural requirements of REm. REv. STAT. § 995-3, supra, do not apply where the
application for modification is filed in the same county in which the divorce decree was
rendered. The instant case relies on this statute even though all the litigation took
place in the same county.
The decision becomes more confusing when it is noted that a writ of prohibition is
an extraordinary remedy which should not lie unless the trial court is wholly without
jurisdiction. See State ex rel. New York Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn. 2d
834, 199 P. 2d 581 (1948).
The instant case, of course, makes little impression on Washington law, but reflects
an unusually strict view of procedure.
RAYmOND H. Simius
Probate-Administration of an Estate Under Absentee Statute. A bank was appointed
guardian of N's estate in 1941, N having been adjudged incompetent. In 1942, N dis-
appeared, and was not heard from for over seven years. P, on behalf of N's heirs,
petitioned the probate court for appointment as administrator of N's estate. The
appointment was made, and the bank appealed. Held: Reversed. Where there is
neither allegation nor evidence sufficient to give the probate court jurisdiction to deter-
mine that the missing man is dead, his heirs are relegated to the absentee statutes for
provisional distribution. In re Nelson's Estate, 37 Wn. 2d 397, 224 P. 2d 347 (1951).
The Washington absentee statute, RCW 11.80.010 et seq. [RRS § 1715-1 et seq.,
PPC § 191-1 et seq.], provides for provisional distribution of an absentee's estate after
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seven years have elapsed from the time of disappearance. The distributees must give
bonds equal to twice the amount which they are to receive in order to protect the
absentee should he return, and due notice by publication of the distribution must be
given. Final distribution and exoneration of the bonds may be had after fifteen years
have elapsed from the time of the absentee's disappearance.
Probate of an estate on the presumption of death alone, which arises when a person
has been absent and has not been heard from for a period of seven years, has been
held valid so long as the presumption of death remains unrebutted. Payne v. Home
Savings Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E. 2d 770 (1942). However, if the absentee returns,
the probate proceedings are void ab initio, because jurisdiction of the probate court is
dependent upon the fact of death. A distribution of the property in such a case would
be a taking of the absentee's property without due process of law. Scott v. MciAeal,
154 U.S. 34 (1894), reversing Scott v. McNeal, 5 Wash. 309, 31 Pac. 873 (1892). On
the other hand, distribution under absentee statutes, as contrasted with probate statutes,
has been held valid even though the absentee is alive. A Pennsylvania absentee statute
which provides for proper notice of distribution and requires the distributees to give
security conditioned that they will return the property distributed to them if the
absentee reappears, was held to meet the requirements of due process of law. Cunins
v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458 (1905). A similar result was reached on a
somewhat different basis under a Massachusetts statute providing for final distribution
14 years after the absentee's disappearance. Since 14 years was considered a reasonable
period of time, this statute was upheld as a statute of limitations which absolutely
divested the absentee of all right to the property. Nelson -v. Blinn, 197 Mass. 279, 83
N.E. 889 (1908), affirmed, 222 U.S. 1 (1911). However, in contrast to the above-
mentioned statutes, a Maryland statute which allowed the court to hold a hearing,
if it saw fit, and to determine the absentee to be dead if no evidence to the contrary was
forthcoming, was held unconstitutional as contrary to due process of law. Bank v.
Weeks, 103 Md. 601, 64 Atl. 295 (1906). The court in that case said that the statute
provided no protection for the absentee if he were alive, and, in effect, it converted a
rebuttable presumption of death into a conclusive presumption.
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Washington Court in Scott v.
McNeal, supra, held that probate of an estate on the seven year presumption was void
if the absentee returned. Nevertheless, a later Washington case held that the probate
court has jurisdiction to determine the absentee to be dead when, together with the
presumption of death, there is also an allegation and circumstantial evidence of death.
State ex rel. Kempf v. Superior Court, 151 Wash. 289, 275 Pac. 694 (1929). However,
until the principal case, it had not been decided in this state whether probate could be
had on the seven year presumption alone, the absentee not having reappeared.
In view of the holding in the Kempf case. it would appear that the Washington
Court in the principal case has gone further than the holding of Scott v. McNeal
requires. There was no holding in the latter case that such probate would be void if the
absentee did not return. In the principal case it might have been held that probate could
be had at the risk of the interested parties, but the holding is that the absentee statute
is exclusive in the absence of further allegations and proof of death. The court seems to
have gone into the legislative field in refusing to probate the estate on the presumption
of death arising from seven years' absence. There is no legislative mandate that the
presumption is not adequate for this purpose. On the contrary, it is considered adequate
for other purposes; e.g., when a person remarries upon the presumption of death of an
absent spouse, this is a defense to a charge of bigamy. RCW 9.15.010 [R.R.S. § 2453
(1), P.P.C. § 113-63 (1)]. Neither direct or circumstantial evidence of death nor a
presumption of death are infallible, and any combination of them will not necessarily be
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complete proof of death.
However, since the court has chosen to refer the parties to the absentee statute, it
must be pointed out that the provisions of the Washington act appear to be a combina-
tion of the better features of the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts statutes; i.e., notice
of distribution, the giving of security by the distributees, and final distribution only
after a reasonable period of years has elapsed. It is likely that it would survive any
attack upon its constitutionality, particularly as a statute of limitations. It has provided
a program which is in accord with established practices in other jurisdictions, and can
be administered under statutes already existing for the purpose of handling this type
of problem.
JAMES B. MITCHELL
Sales-Waiver of Right to Rescind. P installed a heating system in Ds' house, re-
moving and keeping the old furnace as part of the purchase price. On discovering
faulty installation, Ds notified P of their desire to rescind and demanded reinstallation
of the old furnace. P refused and filed a lien for the purchase price on Ds' house,
which he now seeks to foreclose. These events took place in winter, and Ds, aged and
in poor health, continued to use the new heating system, there being no other adequate
means of heating the house. The trial court refused to foreclose the lien and held for
Ds on their counterclaim for rescission based on breach of warranty of proper installa-
tion. Appeal. Held: Reversed. If Ds had a right to rescind, they waived it by con-
tinuing to use the furnace. Coovert v. Ingwerson, 37 Wn. 2d 797, 226 P. 2d 187 (1951).
It is suggested that the court may have been unduly harsh in holding that continued
use constituted a waiver. This may be demonstrated by a consideration of the alternative
courses of conduct open to Ds once they decided to rescind. These were: (1) redelivery
of the furnace to P; (2) installation of another furnace with P's furnace being removed
and held in storage by Ds; (3) discontinuance of use; (4) notice to P to remove his
furnace. To require Ds to follow the first alternative in order to retain their right to
rescind would present an inconsistency with the lien that a rescinding buyer has on
goods received under a sale contract in favor of payments made on the purchase price.
REm. REv. STAT. § 5836-69 [P.P.C. § 852-7] (Uniform Sales Act § 69(5)). The
second alternative would put Ds to the expense of paying a third party to remedy a
situation caused by P's breach, since Ds undoubtedly lack the technical ability to
remove the old furnace and install a new one themselves. Further, there is authority
for placing the duty of removal on the seller who has notice of his buyer's election to
rescind in cases where the latter's residence was the place of delivery. Noll v. Baida,
202 Cal. 98, 259 Pac. 433 (1927) ; White v. Miller, 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 572 (1910) ;
Schaefer v. Lange, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 617 (1907). The third alternative is the most
unreasonable of the four in view of Ds' age and health, the time of year in which the
breach was discovered, and the fact that the new furnace was the sole adequate method
of heating the house. Thus the fourth course of action-that adopted by Ds--appears
to be the most equitable. As the Washington Court has previously said, the remedy of
rescission is equitable in nature, and the circumstances of each case determine what
the party seeking it must do to restore the other to his status quo. Erkenbrack v.
Jenkins, 33 Wn. 2d 126, 204 P. 2d 831 (1949); Hopper v. Williams, 27 Wn. 2d 579,
179 P. 2d 283 (1947).
Foreign courts have frequently reached results contrary to that of the instant case.
Hartnat v. Smyth Sales Inc., 11 N.J. Misc. 168, 11 A. 2d 716 (1939), passing on a
virtually identical fact pattern, held that the buyer was required neither to discontinue
using the furnace nor to have it removed and a new one installed. Similar conclusions
